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6
CHAPTER

Paul Waldau

I

n 1903 W.E.B. Du Bois predicted,
“The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color
line” (1969). One hundred years
later, we can hope that the twentieth
century achieved important advances
for human liberation—not only racial
but also sexual and political. Will that
moral trajectory—the expansion of
fundamental protections now easily
seen as the hallmark of the last century—continue? Will the problem of
the twenty-first century be the problem of the species line?
For protections to evolve to include
nonhuman species, religions—
through their leaders, their institutions, and above all their believers—
must take seriously the important
role that they have played, and certainly will continue to play, in
humans’ engagement with the lives
beyond our species line. Religions
have such a central role in the transmission of basic images and values
regarding living beings that, without
their help, the problem of the species
line will not be solved in this century.
A central question for this century is
whether influential religious institutions will continue to convey images
that radically and absolutely dismiss
nonhumans, or will religions offer
support for the broadening movement to include nonhuman animals
in humans’ moral scope.
If religions notice other species and
take them seriously, ethical sensibilities regarding nonhuman animals
may blossom as fully as did sensibili-

Religion and Animals: A Changing Scene

ties regarding the importance of the
human individual. Various positive
signs at the end of the twentieth century suggested that religions may yet
play an important role in dispelling
the dismissive caricatures of nonhumans animals that prevail in, for
example, industrialized societies. One
of these signs was that religions’ role
in the origin and persistence of both
negative views and positive evaluations of other animals finally was well
described. Another was that many
believers began the difficult task of
engaging their fellow believers in dialogue regarding religions’ strengths
and weaknesses in addressing the
issue of the value of the nonhuman
lives around them.
Where will this vital discussion go
in the new century? Will it help people see the myriad ways in which religious traditions have been vitally
involved in developing the often-dismissive views of nonhuman lives? Will
the discussion bring to the foreground the animal-friendly features
found in every code of religious
ethics? Will religious leaders and
scholars fully delineate the contributions of religion—both good and
bad—to people’s ability to take other
animals seriously? Will many religious
leaders continue to claim that it is
only human lives that really matter?
Will religious traditions be formed
not solely by theologians but also by
grassroots believers attempting to
commit their religion’s resources to
the fullest possible recognition of ani-

mals as beings possessing integrity
and value wholly independent of human needs?
However believers and their leaders
answer these questions, religions will
play a decisive role in humans’
encounters with the nonhuman others
in and near our communities. And
whatever choices any particular religious tradition and its believers make,
a central problem inside and outside
religion will be, without doubt, the
problem of the species line.

1900–1950:
The Dismissal
of Nonhuman
Lives
The science establishment of the
western industrialized countries
began in the early twentieth century
to recognize that nonhuman primates were subject to many of the
same diseases as were humans. The
remarkable physical (and, it was later
recognized, psychological and social)
similarities of nonhuman primates to
humans, however, did not lead scientists, on the whole, to recommend
similar ethical protections for these
evolutionary cousins.
An irony in the thoroughgoing dismissal of all nonhuman lives so characteristic of the first half of the twentieth century was that turn-ofthe-century scientists had inherited a
resurgent interest in the importance
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and complexities of nonhuman animal lives. The 1859 publication of
Darwin’s pivotal Origin of Species had
spurred much new interest in nonhuman lives. In some quarters at least,
commitments to take other animals
seriously flowered relative to the
absolute dismissal and caricature of
nonhuman lives that had prevailed in
western scientific and religious circles before Darwin’s groundbreaking
achievement.
Curiosity about other animals’ lives
manifested itself in many ways, from
increased observation to invasive
studies such as those done in the
1870s by the British physician David
Ferrier, who looked at the relationship of humans to other primates
(Blum 1994). Ferrier’s idea of a systematic study of primate-human relationships was to take apart the brains
of nonhuman primates in order to say
something about the similarity of
humans to other primates. Whole
lives in context, which of course must
be part of any truly systematic study,
also were engaged increasingly, as
exemplified by R.L. Garner’s study in
the 1890s of free-living chimpanzees
(Wrangham et al. 1994). The extensive works of George Romanes —Mental Evolution in Animals (1885) and
Animal Intelligence (1886)—went
through multiple editions. While
often based on anecdote rather than
the rigorous observation standards of
late twentieth century ethology,
Romanes’s work and that of others
reflected deep interest in the lives of
the animals described and an openness to the possibility that some nonhumans were, like humans, possessed
of social, cognitive, and individual
complexities.
As Ferrier’s work shows, by no
means all of what was happening in
the study of nonhuman animals at the
end of the nineteenth century was of
a moral or otherwise sensitive nature.
Darwin’s co-originator of the notion
of natural selection, A.R. Wallace,
shot orangutans in order to study
them—and sadly this was typical of
Victorian naturalists (Galdikas
1995). Such insensitivity was perhaps
a harbinger of attitudes to come, for
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in crucial ways and in important institutions, scientific attitudes toward
other animals were about to go
through a regressive narrowing in the
twentieth century’s first fifty years.

The Narrowing
John Watson (1913) published an
essay that was to set the tone of scientific research into other animals’
cognitive abilities for the next halfcentury. Watson’s approach, which
involved a denial of the mental life of
other animals, was unusual in several
senses. First, a denial of mental life
begs obvious questions. As the Oxford
historian Keith Thomas has noted,
“That there are some footsteps of
reason, some strictures and emissions
of ratiocination in the actions of
some brutes, is too vulgarly known
and too commonly granted to be
doubted” (1984, 124: n.8).
Second, from the scientific perspective, Watson’s views, which were
the foundation of behaviorism, left
much to be desired. Behaviorism,
which in its strictest form emphasizes
the stimulus-response model and
holds that all behavior is learned
through either classical or operant
conditioning, is very ideological, in
the narrowest sense of that term.
Many contemporary scientists hold
that behaviorism involves an explanatory monism—that is, an unnecessarily narrow attempt to provide an
exhaustive causal account of even the
most complex living organism built
arbitrarily upon stimulus-response
generalizations drawn solely from an
isolated part of that being’s complexity. In this regard, behaviorism can in
fact be unscientific, because the
explanatory monism neglects a significant range of data.
Historically behaviorists drew their
inspiration from the philosophical
paradigm of positivism, which led it
to be unnecessarily reductive. Behaviorism’s explanatory monism violates
both observation and such cherished
methodological principles as that of
parsimony. Sometimes it is simply
more consistent with observation and
considerations of parsimony to

explain actions of a living being by
means of higher level functions than
by behaviorism’s simplified stimulusresponse paradigm. In biology intelligence and other “higher level” cognitive functions often are far more
economical as explanations than are
explanations that rely on long chains
of stimulus-response relations.
When the minds of other animals
are ignored, it becomes easier to
treat them as mere machines or inanimate things. The result of such a radical dismissal of the more complex
features of other animals’ lives is that
humans use them as experimental
tools or unfeeling resources. Such
use, and in particular its problems
from the standpoint of both
informed, sensitive science and ethically integrated religion, is well symbolized by Tom Regan’s film We Are
All Noah (1986b), which refers to the
use of thousands of nonhuman animals as experimental subjects on a
boat dubbed “the Atomic Ark” in the
U.S. military’s 1946 Bikini Island
nuclear test in the Pacific.

The Opening
Of course not every development in
science in the first half of the twentieth century reflected a dismissal of
other animals from humans’ ethical
horizon. R.M. Yerkes published The
Great Apes in 1927, but, when doing
his research, he was astonished to find
only travelers’ accounts (Galdikas
1995). Garner’s attempt in the 1890s
to study nonhuman great apes in the
field was to be the only real attempt
before Nissen’s attempt in 1930—
which lasted all of four months
(Goodall, in Wrangham 1994). Thus
for Yerkes the available sources of
information were travelers’ tales
[S]uch as those by T.S. Savage and
J. Wyman in the Ivory Coast in
1842 . . . . [These] provided almost
everything that was known of
chimpanzee behavior in the wild
(although the African peoples who
lived in or near the forests could
have told us more) until the flurry
of field studies began after the Second World War in the early sixties
The State of the Animals II: 2003

(Goodall, in Wrangham, xv).
The first successful study of a wild ape
took place in Asia in the 1930s when
C.R. Carpenter studied white-handed
gibbons in Thailand. His work was
important because Carpenter identified such crucial features of gibbon
adaptation as territoriality and
monogamy. But afterwards all the
gibbons were shot, and it was almost
thirty years until another study (that
of Goodall) was launched (see
Galdikas 1995).
From the late 1930s to the late
1940s, a modern version of Darwin’s
views, sometimes referred to as “the
evolutionary synthesis,” became the
consensus view among established biological scientists. This development
“settled numerous old arguments
once and for all, and thus opened the
way for a discussion of entirely new
problems” (Mayr 1982, 569).
A foreshadowing of much broader
concerns appeared in 1946 when the
International Whaling Commission,
an association of more than two hundred members from forty nations, was
formed under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Although committed not to the
elimination of the killing of cetaceans
but instead to the management of
resources, this international effort
paved the way for both conservation
and abolitionist efforts that developed later in the century, such as the
1986 ban on commercial whaling.
In the 1950s and 1960s, there were
significant developments in various life
sciences regarding a fuller engagement with other animals on the basis
of their realities. Some of these developments came at the prompting of various ethical traditions (though in virtually every case an ethical tradition
outside religion). Many came from a
reassertion of basic scientific values,
such as the importance of humble,
patient empirical observation. In the
early 1960s, careful fieldwork was
commenced (Kortlandt in eastern
Zaire; Goodall in Gombe, Tanzania;
Itani and others in Kabogo, Tanzania;
and Nishida in what is now Mahale
Mountains National Park, Tanzania).
Undoubtedly the most important sciReligion and Animals: A Changing Scene

entific study for the subsequent tradition of careful observation was that of
Jane Goodall on the chimpanzees of
Gombe. Begun in 1960 this effort continues today (see van Lawick-Goodall
1971). Through a series of National
Geographic
television
specials,
Goodall’s work, though initially controversial, stimulated a new generation to pursue careful, observationbased studies of animals of all kinds.
Stephen Jay Gould of Harvard, referring to Goodall as “one of the intellectual heroes of this century” (1995,
23), described her study as “one of the
Western world’s great scientific
achievements” (in Miller 1995).
The fundamental change from the
first half of the century to the second
half also is epitomized by the change
in thinking known as the “Cognitive
Revolution.” In this recent revolution
in psychology, information processing
has been emphasized and the behaviorists’ exclusive focus on conditioning through stimulus-response models has been de-emphasized (see
Gardner 1985; Griffin 1992).
Because of this revolution, there is
a much richer evaluation of the mechanisms of any animal, human or otherwise, that are involved in modification of behavior during growth and
after experience, as well as the relationships among cognition, learning
and development, information processing, representation, imitation,
and problem solving generally.
This important change has not
solved all problems. According to
Griffin, there remains a reluctance to
attribute subjective states to nonhuman animals: “This antipathy to consideration of consciousness threatens
to become a sort of self-inflicted
paralysis of inquiry, and obsolete hindrance to scientific investigation”
(1992, viii).
Yet the bottom line is that science
now has delivered evidence that some
nonhuman animals’ cognitive abilities
are far richer than ever imagined in
the western scientific establishment
and, arguably, in the theological and
philosophical establishments as well.

Religion and
Other Animals
In neither 1900 nor 1950 would religious believers in North America,
Europe, and other parts of the industrialized, “developed” world have
been well described as “concerned”
about the earth’s nonhuman animals.
Some believers were compassionate,
no doubt, but institutions and religious rhetoric were, on the whole,
insensitive to nonhuman animals’
interests. Indeed, the vast majority of
religious believers were not only
unconcerned but also ignorant and
blind insofar as nonhuman animals
were concerned.1
In the succeeding half-century,
however, developments within specific religious traditions have revealed
that religious traditions offer many
perspectives, ethical values, and other
resources for engaging all animals,
human and otherwise, far more sensitively than occurred in the first half of
the twentieth century. In the world of
academic study of religion, the “Caucus on Religion, Animals, and Ethics”
first met in 1998 and has been formalized by the American Academy of
Religion. In 1999 the Center for
Respect of Life and Environment
(affiliated with The Humane Society
of the United States) sponsored a
major conference of international
scholars at Harvard University. This
conference was part of the follow-up
to the groundbreaking series of ten
conferences organized by Mary Evelyn
Tucker and John Grim that established the now flourishing field of religion and ecology.
These developments, along with the
seminal theological work of Linzey
(1987, 1994b), Cohn-Sherbok (1997,
with Linzey), and Masri (1987, 1989),
have led to the emergence of a group
of scholars who now pursue the new
field of religion and animals systematically for the first time in history.
Thus in the last fifty years the state
of animals in religion has, at least in
some respects, changed significantly.
The radical change from the first half
of the twentieth century to the sec87

ond half, described more specifically
below, stimulates many to speculate
on what additional changes may be
seen in both the new century and,
indeed, in this new millennium.

Pre-1950
Religion
and Animals
In 1888 the influential Catholic theologian Joseph Rickaby summed up a
view that in many different ways has
dominated the Christian tradition on
the issue of the moral status of nonhuman animals:
Brutes are as things in our regard:
so far as they are useful for us,
they exist for us, not for themselves; and we do right in using
them unsparingly for our need
and convenience, though not for
our wantonness (1988, 250).
While neither Christianity nor the
other Abrahamic traditions (Judaism
and Islam) are exhaustively represented by such a bald assertion (as will be
shown by what follows), the underlying mentality that nonhuman animals
are on the earth for humans’ use is
representative in two respects of the
ways in which most religious believers
in these traditions viewed nonhuman
animals before the mid-point of the
twentieth century.
First and foremost such a claim is
grounded in what often is referred to
as an instrumentalist view, which
holds that other animals can, unlike
humans, be used in good conscience
for an individual human’s own benefit.2 Second, as Rickaby’s quote
reflects, there was a limiting factor,
namely the injunction not to act “cruelly” or “wantonly.” Such a concern
reflects, no doubt, the deep concern
of some Jews, Muslims, and Christians for the welfare and lives of nonhuman animals. Interestingly, however, in the Christian tradition some
very prominent official objections to
acts of wanton cruelty did not argue
that the problem was the ensuing
harm to nonhuman animals. Rather,
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cruel acts were wrong because they
might lead weak-minded humans to
harm other humans in some way.3
Religious traditions hold, of
course, that humans are special
because of their remarkable moral
abilities. But from 1900 to 1950, religion in many places, including most
circles in North America and Europe,
actively advanced the view that humans, when using their considerable
moral abilities, need focus only on
members of the human species. Such
a view is sometimes referred to as
“ethical anthropocentrism,” and it
frequently is accompanied by an
instrumentalist view of other animals
as mere things rightfully excluded
from the moral circle.
It is important to note, however,
that the combination of anthropocentric ethics with instrumentalist views
of other animals is not the only view
of other animals found within religious traditions. Within Christianity,
for example, more compassionate
views such, as those espoused by St.
Francis of Assisi, long have represented a significant, though often subordinated, sub-tradition regarding the
value of other animals. In general,
however, even if the list of Christians
who have advocated compassion for
nonhuman animals is long and distinguished, it is far shorter, and characterized by far fewer major figures,
than is the list of those who have
advocated an anthropocentric standard. On the longer list is, for example, Pope Pius IX, who led the
Catholic tradition from 1846 to
1878. He is reported to have said to
the anti-vivisectionist Anna Kingsford, “Madame, humankind has no
duties to the animals,” and then
backed this up by opposing the establishment of a society for the protection of animals in Rome (see Gaffney
1986; Kalechofsky 1991).
Apart from its dominant position in
the hierarchy of Christian institutions
and in the mainline theology of the
tradition, ethical anthropocentrism
in one form or another can also be
found in other religious traditions

(Waldau 2001a). Yet they, like Christianity, have moderating sub-traditions that allow adherents to be both
“true believers” and respectful of
nonhuman animals’ interests. In such
sub-traditions, considerable respect
has been accorded to both other animals’ place in the moral circle and
their status as living beings with
whom we share the earth.

Mid-Century
Winds of
Change
From the midpoint of the twentieth
century onward, certain developments have pushed many religious
traditions to become more sensitive
to nonhuman animals as candidates
for moral concern. These developments include increasing interfaith
dialogue; greater historical awareness
of the traditions’ own pro-animal subtraditions and the irrational prejudices against nonhumans within and
across traditions; increasing interest
in the relationship of human ethical
abilities to environmental issues; and,
above all, better information about
nonhuman animals.
Such developments have enhanced
the ability of religious believers to
“see” other animals better. This, of
course, is relevant to how those
believers’ ethical abilities might be
engaged, for, as the English philosopher Stephen Clark has said, “One’s
ethical, as well as one’s ontological
framework is determined by what
entities one is prepared to notice or
take seriously. . . ” (1977, 7).
An essay written by C.S. Lewis
(1963) at mid-century can be used to
highlight dormant possibilities within
religious institutions, especially
because it reveals that even those traditions thought not to be “animal
friendly” have resources for a full
engagement with nonhuman lives.
This is so because each of the traditions is, in fact, an extraordinarily
rich cumulative tradition within
which many past believers have recThe State of the Animals II: 2003

ognized the relevance of human ethical abilities to nonhuman lives.
Apparent in the re-emergence of
these oft-subordinated possibilities
are the beginnings of an important
series of changes that continue to
this day in the established religious
traditions in North America.
Lewis’s essay first appeared in 1947
in the journal of the New England
Anti-Vivisection Society. Later it
appeared in other publications.4 This
seminal article appeals to core beliefs
of Christians about the special qualities of humans’ moral abilities. Thus
even though the arguments are stated in terms of the dualism “humans
and animals” that Lewis was trained
to use by his own religious and cultural traditions, the article reveals
that the Christian tradition has much
to offer those who care enough to
engage the realities of other animals’
actual lives.
Lewis lures the reader into engaging the issue openly by observing that
it is “the rarest thing” in the world to
hear “a rational discussion of vivisection.” He then argues that a rational
discussion must begin with whether
pain is an evil. If pain is not an evil,
Lewis suggests, then the cases both
for and against vivisection fail. He reasons that if pain is not an evil, its
infliction on nonhuman animals need
not be opposed, but, also, if pain is
not an evil, there is no reason to look
for ways to ameliorate it in humans.
The discussion, then, must begin with
recognition that pain is an evil.
Focusing on the standard Christian
position “in the Latin countries. . .that
we are entitled to do anything we
please to animals because they ‘have
no souls’” (1963, 154), Lewis notes
that if this is the case then infliction
of pain on them is “harder to justify,”
[f]or it means that animals cannot deserve pain, nor profit
morally by the discipline of pain,
nor be recompensed by happiness
in another life for suffering in
this. Thus all the factors which
render pain more tolerable or
make it less totally evil in the case
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of human beings will be lacking in
the beasts. “Soulessness,” in so
far as it is relevant to the question
at all, is an argument against vivisection.5
Lewis then appeals to a fundamental claim at the very heart of the
Christian and many other religious
positions, namely, the belief that
humans alone among the earth’s
creatures are moral beings. He uses
this important claim to challenge
facile Christian acceptance of instrumental uses of nonhuman animals:
[W]e may feel that though objective superiority is rightly claimed
for man, yet that very superiority
ought partly to consist in not
behaving like a vivisector—that
we ought to prove ourselves better than the beasts precisely by
the fact of acknowledging duties
to them which they do not
acknowledge to us. (1963, 154)6
Relying relentlessly on common
sense, logic, and frank appraisals of
the general nature of instrumental
uses of other living beings, Lewis adds
many other creative arguments. He
suggests that it was non-Christian values that promoted the argument to
allow vivisection, and he reminds us
that, at least in England, Christian
society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had many resources
for seeing the anti-vivisectionist as a
religious person.7 Lewis’s principled
and, most relevantly, fully Christian
engagement with a facile acceptance
of contemporary instrumental uses of
living beings pushes him to repudiate
completely any casual acceptance of
instrumental uses of other animals:
The victory of vivisection marks a
great advance in the triumph of
ruthless, non-moral utilitarianism
over the old world of ethical law, a
triumph in which we, as well as
animals, are already the victims,
and of which Dachau and Hiroshima are the more recent achievements. (1963, 155)

Traditional and
Compassionate
Views
Lewis’s essay exemplifies both typical
and unusual features of the religion
and animals landscape at mid-century. His arguments are typical in that,
despite his obvious compassion for
pain in other animals, he reflects
what amounts to a dismissal of other
animals’ complex lives as relevant to
their moral standing. In the passages
quoted above, he implies very negative images of nonhuman animals. In
particular, his argument assumes that
because humans understand that
some nonhuman animals act in ways
that humans see as cruel, all nonhuman animals are cruel. This involves
not only the obvious fallacy of overgeneralization, but also the standard
caricature of nonhuman animals that
has dominated western cultures since
the classical Greeks.
Thus because Lewis knew virtually
nothing of the behaviors of the more
complex nonhuman animals and
existed at a time when his culture
sanctioned such ignorance, in an
important sense his arguments merely perpetuate the following culturally
significant stereotypes: (1) of the
earth’s denizens, only humans are
complicated beings; (2) nonhuman
animals live without any kind of moral
or social regard for each other; (3) for
all intents and purposes, all other animals lack intelligence in any significant sense.
When seeking to understand either
the history or the future possibilities
of religion on the issue of nonhuman
animals, it is crucial to recognize that
not all religions have dismissed nonhuman animals in this way. Indeed, at
certain times and places some religious believers have had significant,
empirically based knowledge of other
animals. Accordingly they could be
called upon to point out the caricatures and ignorance that underlie the
generalities used by Lewis. The fallacy
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is, of course, that the absence of evidence has been taken as evidence of
absence. The prevailing ignorance is
not dispelled because no one is looking for complexities, and hence none
is found.
Lewis’s own religious tradition,
along with the other traditions that
have had a significant influence in the
industrialized world, has lost much of
the experienced-based knowledge of
the natural world and its nonhuman
animals that is found, among other
places, in certain religio-cultural traditions now classified among the
“indigenous” traditions. Similarly,
the Christian culture into which
Lewis was born was not characterized
by any ethically developed sense of
humans’ continuity with other animals, although examples of this can
be found throughout the Hindu, Jain,
and Buddhist traditions.8 In fact the
negative views and radical dismissal
of other animals’ lives that underlie
Lewis’s failure to engage any specifics
of the nature and abilities of nonhuman animals relative to humans are
characteristic of many of the most
influential institutions and voices
within those religious traditions that
have the most influence in the industrialized world. In effect these institutions and loud voices, as it were, have
drowned out the voices of the more
compassionate sub-traditions from
within their own circle that have been
willing to promote the moral significance of nonhuman animals.
Nonetheless Lewis’s essay has some
features that begin to bring to light
the additional Christian possibilities
for seeing nonhuman animals. In this
respect Lewis foreshadows some of
the developments seen in other traditions’ believers, engaging insights
sometimes buried deep within the
religion and animals landscape at
mid-century. For example, it is worth
noting that Lewis is arguing as a
Christian and that he reaches his conclusions even though he adheres to,
and in some ways promotes, aspects
of Christianity’s traditional, ignorance-based appraisal of other animals. Thus, in spite of his traditional
views, his profound religious beliefs
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connect him to life generally, and he
thus finds a way to assert that other
animals should matter to Christians
as moral agents. It is as a Christian
that Lewis speaks of the value of
other animals’ lives, and his concern
clearly is to reach Christian colleagues as Christian, as well as the
Christian establishment that had
been quiet about humans’ instrumentalist uses of other animals. This is
precisely why Lewis emphasizes the
cherished senses of (1) human
uniqueness and (2) human moral
abilities that lie at the center of
Christianity and all other religious
traditions. Through a focus on our
important ability to care about others, be they human or not, Lewis
questions the facile, absolute dismissal of all nonhuman animals that
dominated his own religious traditions during his lifetime (he died in
1963). In making this challenge,
Lewis reflects the internal resources
established religion has available for
the task of reexamining modern
industrialized societies’ radical marginalization of other animals.
In reflecting both the traditional
and more compassionate sides of contemporary religious traditions, Lewis
reflects well the dilemma regarding
nonhuman animals faced by religion
in the twentieth century. His essay,
particularly as it highlights the very
un-Christian (in Lewis’s view) features
of the modern practice of vivisection,
sets the stage well for understanding
the complex trajectory of developments within religious traditions
since 1950 on the issue of “animals.”
During the last half of the twentieth
century, informed religious believers
had to come to terms with the consequences of the modern world’s
increasingly radical, virtually absolute
dismissal of all nonhuman animals as
valued individuals deserving protection as individuals. It is noteworthy,
for example, that Lewis does not
argue the Christian’s duty is to
species, and he never alludes to the
issue of loss of species. His concern is
with individuals who are harmed by a
specific practice, not the qualitatively
different concern for biodiversity. It is

this standard of sensitivity to other living things as individuals that Lewis
names in this essay as the proper
Christian standard. Even if such sensitivity is not altogether new, but rather
a reaffirmation of a sub-tradition that
has existed in Christian and other religious traditions all along, it provides a
challenge to contemporary mainline
Christianity. This is a formidable and
identity-threatening challenge, for the
mainline Christian tradition, not
unlike mainline interpretations of
other religious traditions, has in its
ancient, medieval, and contemporary
theology promoted anthropocentric,
exclusivist views and practices among
its believers and churches.

Competing
Tensions
The tension in Lewis’s article between
elements of the traditional view that
humans are superior to all other animals, on the one hand, and those
morality-based implications so creatively argued by Lewis, on the other
hand, can be used to frame not only
the issues that faced religion at midcentury on the issue of the status and
importance of nonhuman animals,
but also the issues facing today’s religious communities, churches, synagogues, mosques, and other places of
worship or meditation.
First, tension is occasioned by the
very questions Lewis and other believers ask concerning modern practices
in an environment where religious
communities and believers promote a
status quo dominated by anthropocentrism in ethics as well as in politics, economics, law, and even academia. Lewis’s modeling of possibilities
of extending concern and compassion
can easily be based on passages in the
Qur’an, the Hebrew Bible, the Christian New and Old Testaments (in their
original and translated forms), the
Vedas from Hinduism, any of the Buddhist canons, or the astonishingly rich
stories of indigenous religious traditions that support the extension of
deep concern to nonhuman animals.
These stories have remained a part of
The State of the Animals II: 2003

even the main line, anthropocentric
interpretations of those religious traditions that predominate in the industrial world. Thus even if the dominant
stories in Christianity and other religions take an instrumentalist approach to “humans and animals” and
confine their believers’ focus to humans alone, believers still can find elements of compassion that can be
extended to nonhuman animals. If
they do so, they are likely to find tension between that choice and the standard assumptions made in their own
community or place of worship.
Second, merely naming the possibility of a more compassionate view as
the truest Christian (or Jewish, Muslim, etc.) position creates tension.
Lewis was extraordinarily popular in
his native England, and he remains an
icon in many conservative Christian
circles in the United States. Yet
despite the fact that Lewis is widely
held by conservative Christians to be
a person of vision, his conclusions in
this essay remain unrealized. What’s
more, they are rarely, if ever, cited.
The latter fact suggests that,
although certain concerns for nonhuman animals that are grounded in the
Christian tradition’s most basic values have been and continue to be
brought to the forefront by some
major voices heard in contemporary
circles, they have had but a limited
effect. There are, without question,
very strong competing values in the
Christian tradition that negate concern for nonhuman animals. Still,
Lewis’s gambit remains a constant
challenge on explicitly Christian
grounds to the practice of vivisection.
His arguments can be seen as a foreshadowing of the contemporary
debates both within and without religious circles on the issue of nonhuman animals’ moral significance.
Third, even greater tension now is
evident on the issues Lewis
addressed, for when he published this
essay instrumental uses of nonhuman
animals were just beginning to
increase. The extraordinarily harsh
features of intensive, or factory, farming; widespread use of nonhuman animals in experiments; and, of course,
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genetic engineering of animals to
model human diseases were basically
unknown to Lewis. These uses, some
of which are described elsewhere in
this volume, now dominate humans’
relations with other animals.
Yet even if the Christian and other
Abrahamic traditions have not yet
given Lewis’s reasoning any real
standing in the debate over the propriety of the widespread contemporary practices that so obviously
inflict pain and suffering on nonhuman living beings, Lewis’s and other
similar arguments continue to mark
the possibilities of religious believers
being open to the significance of
other animals’ lives. Since Lewis
wrote this essay as a Christian argument for other Christians, his work
continues to suggest that Christianity and other religions can use their
own internal resources to provide
insights into the importance of the
lives of other animals.

The Image
of God and
Dominion
Ethical anthropocentrism characteristically is driven by the notion that
humans are different from “animals.”
That humans are different in significant respects is, of course, both
important and true, though this point
often is overstated in the extreme. As
Radner and Radner note:
Obviously there are differences
between humans and other
species. Every species is different
from every other species: this
much is plain biology. The ideology lies not in the search for differences, but in the unwavering
belief that humanity is defined by
attributes that have absolutely no
precedent in the rest of the biological world. (1989, 8)
In many contemporary forms of
religious traditions, in particular the
Abrahamic traditions, as well as in
many secular traditions, the separation of humans from other animals is
one of the forces that prevent humans

from achieving a better understanding of their place in the ecological
webs that link all lives. White, in a
piece that has become one of the
most notorious of modern essays,
argued that the Christian doctrine of
creation, particularly as it was elaborated in medieval times, forms “the
historical roots of our ecological crisis,” and that “orthodox Christian
arrogance toward nature” thus “bears
a huge burden of guilt” for present
problems. White’s thesis was based on
the premise that our increasing ability to control and harness natural
forces is flawed by the assumption
that “we are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for
our slightest whim” (1967, 1206).
This led White to comment:
Especially in its Western form,
Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has
ever seen. . . . Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism
and Asia’s religions. . . not only
established a dualism of man and
nature but also insisted that it is
God’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends. (1205)
White’s analysis can be seen, upon
even superficial consideration, to be
in important respects a rhetorical
and unfair overstatement, for a wide
variety of factors other than religious
ones, such as economic, social, political, and historical, underlie contemporary environmental practices (see
also Merchant [1980] for the change
from an organically oriented mentality to a mechanically oriented mentality between 1500 and 1700).
White’s thesis has been very valuable, however, in raising awareness of
how profoundly religious values have
influenced the ways believers
approach living beings. Jeremy Cohen
(1989), among others, has argued
persuasively that White’s claims are
wrong in some important specifics,
since the dominion charge of Genesis
1:28 (relied on heavily by White) was
not taken by ancient and medieval
readers as any sort of license “selfishly to exploit the environment or to
undermine its pristine integrity”
(309). Cohen notes, however, that the
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language of Genesis 1:28 (which
reads, in the Revised Standard Version, “Be fruitful and increase, fill the
earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish in the sea, over the
birds of the air, and over every other
living thing that moves on the earth”)
was consistently taken as a divine call
to rule over other animals. This analysis provides an interesting example of
the how “environmental” issues and
“animal” issues are by no means identical and do not overlap perfectly,
even though they are obviously related. Conflating them under the rubric
“environmental concerns” can, interestingly, make many nonhuman animals disappear from the moral landscape altogether. This happens, for
example, when the exclusive focus is
on species conservation and not on
treatment of individuals from species
that are not threatened. The upshot
is that many morally relevant issues
regarding nonhuman animals sometimes disappear in environmental
discourse even if those who employ
language that is eminently “environmental” have the best of intentions
and are obviously in earnest about the
relevance of the lives of nonhuman
animals to us as moral agents.

ers often exhibit far more mutual
understanding now and better awareness of each other. In general the
leadership of religious institutions
has become much more willing to tolerate, talk to, and even respect,
believers of other religious traditions,
though, of course, many well-known
problems involving religious toleration remain unsolved.9 Nonetheless
pluralism has become an accepted
phenomenon, grounded institutionally, politically, and philosophically by
the open-minded work of the World
Council of Churches and such pioneers as John Hick, Masao Abe, Ninian Smart, Sallie McFague, Rosemary
Radford Ruether, Karl Rahner, John
Cobb, Huston Smith, and Wilfred
Cantwell Smith. Their work has been
advanced by other philosophers, comparativists, theologians, and religious
leaders, including Diana Eck, Arvind
Sharma, Sulak Sivaraksa, Keith Ward,
Jonathan Smith, Karen Armstrong,
David Tracy, Langdon Gilkey, Mary
Evelyn Tucker, Dan Cohn Sherbok,
and Jay McDaniel. Such believers
reflect well the openness that religious belief can stimulate when it
notices and takes other perspectives
seriously.

The Realities
of Change

The Prevailing
Context and
Reality

Of great relevance to understanding
the possibilities of change in religious views of nonhuman animals is
the fact that religion at the start of
the twenty-first century is, as it were,
a different animal from what it was in
the middle of the twentieth century.
Negative factors pushed such a
change, including astonishing ethnic, political, religious, and economic oppression, widespread ecological
damage, and a proliferation of refugee crises brought on by countless
wars. Positive factors pushing this
change included increased communication, changing demographics, and
interfaith dialogue.
The result of these and other factors prompting change has been that
religious traditions and their believ92

The changes discussed here in the
vast and diverse realm of religion
took place in the late twentieth century, and continue in the new century, at the same time as an extraordinary ferment concerning perspectives
on the diverse group of living beings
referred to as “animals.” One influential philosopher describes the changing values regarding nonhuman animals, especially as these values are
enshrined in federal protections of
laboratory animals, as a changing
social ethic (Rollin 1999).
These important changes have been
manifested in countless ways outside
of religious traditions. In media and
literature, discussions regarding the

status of nonhuman animals now
abound, as they do in the ever-proliferating forest of biological sciences.
Awareness of nonhuman animals in
recent decades has not, however, been
led by religious traditions. It has been
led more by two forces: (1) primarily
secular forces in industrialized countries, and (2) various life sciences
such as primatology and marine mammalogy under the guidance of such
recognized authorities as Goodall
(chimpanzees), Roger and Katy Payne
(whales), and Cynthia Moss, Joyce
Poole, and Katy Payne (elephants). In
philosophical circles a broad discussion has been taking place concerning
ethical issues as a secular matter; this
has been especially prominent since
the 1975 publication of Animal Liberation, by Peter Singer.
The emergence of widespread interest in protecting nonhuman animals
in some manner or another has led
to a complex social movement,
often misleadingly labeled “animal
rights.”10 This broad movement is a
particularly forceful manifestation of
many humans’ concern to include at
least some animals as “others” whom
their ethical values address. Environmental interests, though often
exceedingly anthropocentric, also
were part and parcel of the industrialized world’s expansion of the moral
circle in the late twentieth century
and surely will continue to be relevant
to the protection of nonhuman animals. Of particular significance is the
development and popularization of
science-based information regarding
nonhuman animals. This has occurred in such fields as ethology, conservation biology, animal behavior,
and cognitive science.
These developments are powerful
supports for the burgeoning social
concern for nonhuman animals. Of
perhaps even greater importance,
however, is the dramatic change in
attitudes and values, described elsewhere in this volume, regarding companion animals. This phenomenon
alone is pushing remarkable changes
in awareness (see Rowan 1988; Manning and Serpell 1994), as evidenced
in the changing landscape of veteriThe State of the Animals II: 2003

nary medicine and values (see Rollin
1999; Tannenbaum 1995).
The changes in values and attitudes
toward nonhuman animals have been
so rapid and dramatic that even some
of the most conservative realms of
industrialized societies, including
major religious institutions, now
reflect such changes, though often in
only small ways. In the United States,
lawyers have been instrumental in
pushing the legal system to consider
whether moral standing for nonhuman animals should be enshrined by
way of legal rights in legislative and
litigation arenas.11 Law is, of course,
an area of society whose discourse is
often “privileged,” that is, legal discussions and terminology often are
given a special level of respect by society at large and by media. Thus law
has a profound effect on many other
areas. Other privileged areas are politics, economics, academics, and,
importantly, religious discussions.
Debates, media, and other ongoing
conversations in any one of these
realms can affect many outside that
realm. Ferment in these areas can,
thus, be of extraordinary significance
in fostering cultural changes.

Animals at
the End of
the Twentieth
Century
The second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twentyfirst have manifested an extraordinary
increase in humans’—and thus religious believers’—interest in animals.
This has been promoted by better
observations, a phenomenon helped
along by the fact that assessments of
other animals no longer are dominated by (1) the ideology of narrow, dismissive views that, in large part, originated in religious traditions; (2) the
equally narrow-minded ideology of
early twentieth-century science (in
the form of behaviorism and its dismissive, Cartesian premises); or (3)
the longstanding tradition of anthroReligion and Animals: A Changing Scene

pocentric ethics that dominated
Western daily and intellectual life,
and which had roots in both the Abrahamic traditions and classical Greek
presuppositions about the special
nature of human minds.
A consensus is emerging in which
many humans now understand that
humans cannot continue to destroy
the ecological niches they occupy;
that the earth itself needs to be the
beneficiary of human ethical sensitivities; and that at least some nonhuman living beings are complex beings
worthy of ethical consideration in
their own right. This consensus is the
foundation for a change in perspective on nonhuman animals that is
pushing religious traditions to revamp their conceptuality and discourse.
To be sure the changes in attitudes
toward nonhuman animals that have
taken place since 1950 have not all
been positive. In some senses nonhuman animals are treated worse than
ever before. This certainly is true in
terms of numbers killed for human
use and in terms of the environmental
destruction that affects so much nonhuman life. Hence there remains tension of many kinds—over wildlife in
backyards, the use of nonhuman animals for experiments, the destruction
of so many unwanted companion animals by shelters, genetic engineering
of nonhuman animals, captivity of
animals in zoos, and experimentation. These tensions were, at the end
of the twentieth century, being
addressed by more than 10,000 organizations in more than 130 countries
(de Kok 1999).12

The Complex
Terrain at
Century’s Dawn
The ferment in the fields studying
religion and in those engaging nonhuman animals will, no doubt, produce extraordinary challenges—and
opportunities—for the emerging
study of religion and animals. As conservative as many parts of the worlds

of religion and religious studies
remain, these domains in some
respects are advanced relative to the
discussions now going on in the legal,
political, and business worlds. The
academic world reflects openness to
the study of religions but remains
quite conservative on the issue of
moral value beyond humanity. Discussions in academic circles remain
uneven and as yet without much
impact on politics and business practices. But in some realms—including
the academic study of religion and of
law—concerns for other animals now
surface in interesting ways. The 1999
conference “Religion and Animals”
and the emergence of “animal law”
classes at leading law schools are but
two examples of the ways in which the
world of education reflects an increased profile for the interests of
nonhuman animals.
The upshot of such profound, complex, and widespread change is that
many people perceive other animals
differently now from how they did in
1950. This is particularly true not
only of companion animals, who have
become significantly more important
in private lives, but also of wild animals and experimental animals.
Noticeably absent, though, are food
animals, who in the vast majority of
cases remain without effective legal
protections of even a minimal sort.
Such changes create additional
pressure on religious traditions, for
they remain the primary source of
ethics and world view for the majority
of the human race. As might be
expected, in such a context of change
noteworthy concern has emerged in
religious communities. They, like so
many other communities in contemporary society, reflect the profound
changes at many different levels and
in many different ways. This is apparent in the daily activities of believers
as well as at the most learned levels,
such as contemporary theological
thinking on the environment (see, for
example, the website of the Forum on
Religion and Ecology).
In assessing how religious traditions have responded, it is good to
recall that concern for nonhuman
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animals is a venerable tradition that
reaches well back into all religious
traditions (see Regan 1986; Masri
1987, 1989; Salisbury 1994; Linzey
and Cohn-Sherbok 1997; Grant 1999;
and Waldau 2001b). Some of the bestknown concerns are those manifested
in the religions that originated in
India, such as the Hindu traditions,
the Jain religion, and various forms of
Buddhism. In addition many indigenous traditions, including those of
the original inhabitants of North
America, often are cited for their animal-friendly concerns. Such concerns
also abound in the ancient strata of
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and
often are cited when the importance
of other animals is discussed.
Despite the availability of these profound resources, the situation is, in
many respects, one of continuing
myopia. There is a certain irony in
this, since White argued that even
though
[w]e shall continue to have a worsening ecological crisis until we
reject the Christian axiom that
nature has no reason for existence but to serve man. . . [b]oth
our present science and our present technology are so tinctured
with orthodox Christian arrogance towards nature that no
solutions for our ecologic crisis
can be expected from them alone.
. . . [S]ince the roots of our trouble are so largely religious, the
remedy must be essentially religious, whether we call it that or
not. (1967, 1207)
White’s main hope was a refocused
Christianity rather than a wholesale
repudiation of it; he suggested a
return to the alternative Christian
views of humans’ relation to the
earth, especially as such alternatives
are exemplified by St. Francis’s
respect for the living world.
Yet a contemporary example suggests how shallow and incomplete the
changes within religious communities have been on essential issues. In
1993 the Parliament of the World’s
Religions held a meeting in Chicago,
the end product of which was a short
declaration (Küng and Kuschel
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1993). The meeting took place a century after the original Parliament of
World Religions, which did so much
to promote interfaith dialogue
throughout the twentieth century. A
careful reading of the document
signed at the 1993 meeting reveals
that it perpetuates the traditional,
harmful prejudice in favor of all
humans to the exclusion of all other
animals (Waldau 1995). This continuing shortsightedness causes a failure
to see those other animals as the
diverse and sometimes complex creatures they are.
To be sure, the 1993 document has
some inclusive features. Addressing
the important needs of all humans
and giving prominence to environmental concerns, the introductory
paragraphs are dominated by themes
of inclusion, consideration, protection, and involvement. Within its
opening sentences, the declaration
acknowledges that global problems
affect all life on earth. The introduction goes on to mention “life” several
more times, the “ecosystems,” “community of living beings,” “animals,”
“plants,” “preservation of Earth, the
air, water and soil,” and “naturefriendly ways of life” (Küng and
Kuschel 1993, 13–16).
Despite this auspicious beginning,
these seemingly inclusive references
are bracketed by at least eleven
explicit references to human interests alone. There is an irony in this,
given that many nonhuman individuals possess considerable complexity
and, in important ways, share identical, similar, or comparable interests
as a matter of biology and/or personality (see, for example, Parker and
Gibson 1990: Cavalieri and Singer
1994). But by and large, at the end of
the twentieth century, religions had
failed to engage such specifics. The
declaration’s preoccupation with the
interests of the human species to the
effective exclusion of the interests of
all other species is an imbalance that
threatens to perpetuate the traditional view that, of all the species on
earth, the only one of real significance, because its individuals are distinctive and of value in their own

right, is the human species. The declaration does not really engage the
deeply meaningful proposition that
there can be value and integrity in
nonhumans completely independent
of exclusively human interests.
Major figures in contemporary theology manifest this anthropocentrism. J. Moltmann, whose Gifford
Lectures in 1984–1985 were published under the inspiring title God In
Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of
Creation (1985), spends a great deal
of time on arguments about human
arrogance, which he calls “anthropocentrism,” and this naturally leads
the reader to expect that his broadly
titled text will engage the possibility
of seeing other animals. Yet tellingly,
nonhuman animals are ignored in the
book, as there is no mention of any
nonhuman animals that carries any
significance. Similarly the highly
respected theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg published Toward a Theology
of Nature: Essays on Science and
Faith (1993). This text is more of the
same, as it in no way engages the
extraordinarily rich perspectives
developed in such biological sciences
as primatology and marine mammal
studies (Waldau 2001b).
Catholic documents from the end
of the twentieth century continue to
reflect the fact that anthropocentrism in ethics has important and still
powerful strongholds in established
religion. The 1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae is not nearly as broad as
its beautiful title (translated as “the
gospel of life”) suggests, for its language and arguments continue to
promote an unabashed ethical anthropocentrism—the only “life” it
focuses on is human life. None of the
twenty references to nonhuman living
beings gives any hint of, let alone
makes serious reference to, the value
of the lives of any living beings outside the human species. What makes
for a certain irony in this approach
is the extremely heavy concentration
in the document on humans before
they are born. As noted by the feminist whose work most fully engages
the moral significance of nonhuman
animals,
The State of the Animals II: 2003

The speciesism of Homo sapiens
is perhaps nowhere more pronounced than in the protestation
about the fate of the human conceptus and zygote, while the sentiency of the other animals is
declared morally irrelevant because they are not human beings.
(Adams 1994, 60)
Noting this irony is not meant to
suggest that “the fate of the human
conceptus and zygote” should be
unimportant, subordinate, or in any
way treated as irrelevant. The lives of
future humans are, by almost total
consensus in contemporary societies,
extremely important to all humans
even if the right of a future human to
be born conflicts dramatically with
the obviously important issue of an
individual woman’s need to make her
own moral decision about what is
happening within her own body. But
the absence of any meaningful reference to nonhuman animals in a major
doctrinal statement that by its own
title purports to deal with the importance of “life” suggests that nonhuman animals are not yet an important
concern for the hierarchy of this large
and influential religious tradition
within Christianity.
Such lack of references to the realities and importance of nonhuman
animals is ironic, given that some animals have the very traits that we value
in ourselves as the basis of our own
moral significance—such as family
connections and loyalty, intelligence,
communication, emotions, social
structure, and even cultural transmission. The daily realities of nonhuman
animals are addressed in ethology
and related sciences; of particular
interest in recent years has been the
development of “cognitive ethology,”
which is providing much more information about the mental, emotional,
and social dimension of nonhuman
lives (see, for example, Allen and
Bekoff 1997.) That the Catholic
Church is likely to continue to ignore
such realities and espouse what above
has been called an instrumentalist
view is confirmed by the following
pronouncement in the 1994 revised
Catholic Catechism: “Animals [meanReligion and Animals: A Changing Scene

ing, of course, ‘all nonhuman animals’], like plants and inanimate
things, are by nature destined for the
common good of past, present, and
future humanity” (para. 2415).
As C.S. Lewis might have argued in
1950, approaches to creation (to use
Moltmann’s 1985 term), nature (Pannenberg’s 1993 term), and life (the
term so central in the 1995 encyclical
Evangelium Vitae) that continue to
ignore nonhuman animals completely
are in some ways contrary to a core
message and value found in religious
traditions. Acting on this intuition or
value is a central feature of a moral
and/or religious life generally. And
even if a specific religious tradition
makes claims about human superiority, that message does not excuse, as
Andrew Linzey (1987, 1994b) has so
well shown, complete failure to take
any nonhuman animals’ lives into
account.
Indeed it is virtually impossible to
argue that any religious tradition’s
core message is that other life is
unimportant, although this is admittedly a subtext or “meta-message” of
the rhetoric of many well-respected
religious leaders. Religious believers
may be heirs to the claim that
humans are theologically more significant than any other animals, but that
claim has nothing to do with the logically distinguishable claim that the
religion authorizes humans to ignore
the realities of other animals.
The great value of Lewis’s essay is
its suggestion that it is part of the
Christian view of humans’ theologically superiority that religious believers be responsible for, and learn
about, the consequences for nonhuman animals of humans’ current
manner of living. This same kind of
reasoning, so reliant on the internal
resources of each religious tradition,
is available to any religious believer
when the issue is the suffering, death,
and other material effects—including
environmental consequences—that a
believer’s consumer choices and
political decisions have on nonhuman
individuals.

Prospects in
the Twenty-first
Century
One could fairly conclude, then, that
religions can rise above the obviously
anthropocentric concerns that have
dominated so many religious traditions in the twentieth century. The
manifest lack of church, synagogue,
mosque, and other religious community involvement in challenging the
most egregious abuses of nonhuman
animals remains a principal feature of
the contemporary religious scene.
That this is true in North America is
suggested by respected sociologists
when they comment, “The animal
rights movement [is] a new social
movement noted for its participants’
lack of ties to traditional Judeo-Christian religion” (Peek, Konty, and Frazier 1997, 429). Changing this reality
is, no doubt, the principal challenge
facing religion in North America,
dominated as it is by what is sometimes referred to as the Judeo-Christian tradition.13 Traditions do not necessarily need to reach outside
themselves to solve the current
dilemma for, as Lewis’s essay suggests, religious traditions can have
“core” or fundamental values that are
both relevant and buried and which,
once “unearthed,” as it were, can be
brought to bear on the prevailing
indifference toward nonhuman animals. There is evidence of this kind of
movement, but it remains marginalized. Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok have
written often and eloquently of the
values manifest in both theological
and historical parts of their traditions
(respectively, Christian and Jewish)
(see, for example, Linzey and CohnSherbok 1997). Similar analyses exist
for Islam (for example, Masri 1987,
1989), and of course for Hindu, Jain,
Buddhist, and many indigenous traditions in Africa, Asia, South America,
North America, Australia, and various
island cultures (see Suzuki and
Knudtson 1992; Grim 2001). Indeed
plumbing the conservative views of
the Catholic hierarchy reveals that
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there is some movement within that
tradition. For the first time ever, the
Catholic Catechism issued in 1994
included an official statement from
the Catholic Church that believers
have more than indirect obligation to
nonhuman animals.14 A required
“religious respect for the integrity of
creation” is explained in paragraph
2416, which states:
Animals are God’s creatures. He
surrounds them with this providential care. By their mere existence they bless him and give him
glory. Thus men owe them kindness. We recall the gentleness
with which saints like St. Francis
of Assisi or St. Philip of Neri treated animals.
Before celebrating this important
movement, it is important to
acknowledge that, while this first-ever
Catholic Church admission indicates
that humans owe duties directly to
some nonhuman animals (thus implying that the lives of these nonhuman
animals have a moral dimension), the
concession is extremely limited. Paragraph 2415, in addition to the passage already quoted, includes various
factors that override Paragraph
2416’s historically new concern for
direct duties to nonhuman animals.
These factors include our duties to
“neighbors” and “future generations,” both of which, predictably,
refer to humans alone even though
the terms “neighbors” and “future
generations” on their face apply to
nonhuman animals. In other words,
the primary concern of the revised
Catholic Catechism is the traditional,
exclusive focus on members of the
human species alone.
It is fair to ask whether this really is
much movement, and what will happen in the future given the new abilities of humans to use nonhuman animals under the power of such
technologies as genetic engineering.
On the whole such complex specific
problems, including widespread and
uncontrolled experimentation on
nonhuman animals for humans’ benefit or profit, and the cruel conditions
of intensive rearing conditions (see
Regan 1986a), remain unaddressed
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by the vast majority of the religious
establishment and its leaders. This
means that the “on the ground realities” in ordinary churches remain
anthropocentric in the extreme.
One hope, of course, is the burgeoning concern in religious traditions for the “environment.”15 This
reflects the increasingly inclusive
nature of ethics today, as well as the
implicit theological dimensions of
any ethical discussion. Holistic, environmental themes increasingly are
found in works by religious believers
as religious believers, examples of
which include Christian thinkers such
as Thomas Berry, Dieter Hessel, and
Jay McDaniel; Muslim thinkers such
as Mawil Y. Izzi Deen and B. A. Masri;
Buddhists such as Sulak Sivaraksa
and the Dalai Lama; and numerous
representatives from Judaism, Hinduism, and a wide range of indigenous
traditions.
The state of current literature,
however, is a signpost of how little has
been done regarding other animals,
even though other animals often are
mentioned in studies of symbolism.
These studies form, however, classic
examples of what Adams (1994) calls
the “absent referent”—in other
words, the animals themselves are
nowhere to be found. At the dawn of
the new millennium, there still was
no systematic work on the topic of
religion and animals, although the
papers from the “Religion and Animals” conference were close to publication.

A Continuing
Role for
Traditions
Any member of any of the major world
religions, including Muslims, Jews,
Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, as well
as adherents of indigenous and other
religious traditions, can fully embrace
nonhuman animals and remain completely faithful to their own tradition.
As with ecological insights, compassionate concerns for other animals
are well grounded in the ethical

insights of virtually all religious traditions. Thus humane reforms, as is the
case with ecological reform, can find
homes in the cosmologies, stories,
and communities of contemporary
religions.
But will religious traditions continue to promote anthropocentric ethics
alone, or will they enlarge their moral
circles? One important factor in the
future trajectory of religious concerns for nonhuman animals will be
the continuing revolution in values in
developed world societies, for as the
philosopher Bernard Rollin suggests
(1999, 3), “Most now realize . . . that
society is in the process of changing
its view of animals, and of our obligation to animals.”
Religious traditions can advance or
retard such changes, or they can take
a unique leadership role in this
process because of their profound
commitment to the ethical abilities
of humans.
Today the fundamental questions
for religions, as for all humans, are
these: Who are the “others?” Will the
“others” protected by human, religious, and ethical sensibilities be only
humans? Will religions cross the
species line in the twenty-first century? The verdict remains out on just
what kind of force religious traditions
will become in this important area of
human existence.
Notes

1Religions were also, to be sure, blind to many

humans, as evidenced by both widespread religious intolerance and the all too cozy relationship between established religious institutions
and oppressive regimes, imperialist foreign powers, and capitalist corporations. The major theological movement known as “liberation theology”
describes the latter; see, for example, Brown
(1993).
2Because this attitude focuses on the usefulness of nonhuman animals for human purposes,
such views sometimes are described as “utilitarian” (for example, by C.S. Lewis in a passage quoted below). If such a description is used, however,
one must be careful not to confuse this attitude
with the very distinctive, animal-friendly theory of
ethics called “utilitarianism” historically associated with the eighteenth-century philosopher
Jeremy Bentham and the nineteenth-century
philosopher John Stuart Mill and exemplified
today by the works of Peter Singer. See, for example, Singer (1990).
3This is the traditional Catholic position. See,
for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2a, 2ae, q. 64. art. 1, ad. 3; Summa Contra
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Gentiles Bk. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 112, art. 13.
4The original title was simply “Vivisection.”
Clyde Kilby reports (1995) that the article was
published in 1948 in London for the National
Anti-Vivisection Society. As late as 1963 it
appeared in The Anti-Vivisectionist (March/April,
154–5), where it has the longer title “Can Christians Support Vivisection?” The page numbers
given here are from the 1963 version.
5As a technical matter, this is the position of
only some Christians. The leading theologian of
Catholicism, Thomas Aquinas, followed Aristotle
in holding that all living beings have a soul. The
practical consequences of this are not significant,
however, in that Catholic theology, as noted
below, has always asserted humans’ complete
superiority to nonhuman animals.
6Lewis also makes another argument as to why
the standard Christian position is troubling: “We
may find it difficult to formulate a human right of
tormenting beasts in terms which would not
equally imply an angelic right of tormenting
men” (154).
7It is interesting to contrast this with today’s
general view that the animal rights movement is
a secular phenomenon. See, in particular, the
comment at the end of this chapter made by sociologists Peek, Konty, and Frazier (1997) regarding the non-involvement of the Judeo-Christian
tradition.
8It would be misleading to infer from this comment that these other traditions have been without problems in the many ways in which they have
seen and otherwise engaged nonhuman animals.
On the limitations in the views and values regarding other animals in various other traditions, see
Waldau (2000 a,b,c; 2001a).
9The term interfaith dialogue frequently is used
to describe the many conversations now taking
place. The journal World Faiths Encounter, in
which Waldau (1995) was published, is a good
example of the breadth and depth of this phenomenon.
10The term is misleading because not all proponents seek either moral or legal rights. For the
history of the animal protection movement in the
twentieth century, see Jasper and Nelkin (1992)
and Finsen and Finsen (1994).
11There now are many courses on “animal
law,” the most publicized of which is the Harvard
Law School class that began in 2000. The trend
toward inclusion of this topic continues, with Yale
Law School most recently offering an animal law
study group in spring 2003. The best-known legislation is the Animal Welfare Act, first enacted in
1966 and regularly amended thereafter.
12In the United States alone, more than
10,000 animals per day are killed for want of a
home. Details are available at the website of The
Humane Society of the United States,
www.hsus.org.
13Some scholars, such as Kimberley Patton of
Harvard Divinity School, observe that this is a
very misleading phrase, for it fails to signal that
the Jewish and Christian traditions are much less
alike than, say, the Islamic and Jewish traditions.
14Andrew Linzey (1994a) has noted that these
1994 statements of the Catholic Church go
beyond the pre-1994 official position of the
Catholic Church, which Linzey has described as
“we [humans] do not have direct duties” (1987).
Linzey also refers to some limitations on humans’
“stewardship” in the 1987 encyclical Sollicitudo
Rei Socialis.
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15A Harvard series on “religion and ecology”
(the individual titles can be found at http://environment. harvard.edu/religion, the website of the
Forum on Religion and Ecology) includes many
decidedly positive estimates of how local religious
communities already are undertaking environmentally sensitive programs that affect many
nonhuman animals in favorable ways.

Literature Cited
Adams, C.J. 1994. The sexual politics
of meat: A feminist-vegetarian critical theory. New York: Continuum.
Allen, C., and M. Bekoff, 1997.
Species of mind: The philosophy and
biology of cognitive ethology. Cambridge: Bradford/MIT Press.
Aquinas, T. Latin text and English
trans. by T. Gilby et al. 1964–1981.
Summa theologiae. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
_______. Trans. and with an introduction and notes, by A.C. Pegis, J.F.
Anderson, J.Bourke, C.J.O’Neil.
Summa contra gentiles. 1975.
Notre Dame. (Originally published
as Saint Thomas Aquinas, On the
truth of Catholic Faith, New York,
1955–57.)
Blum, D. 1994. The monkey wars.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Brown, R.M. 1993. Liberation theology: An introductory guide.
Louisville: Westminster/John Knox.
Cavalieri, P., and P. Singer, eds. 1994.
The Great Ape Project: Equality
beyond humanity. New York: St.
Martin’s Press.
Catechism of the Catholic Church.
1994. London: Geoffrey Chapman.
Clark, S.R.L. 1977. The moral status
of animals. Oxford: Clarendon.
Cohen, J. 1989. “Be fertile and
increase, file the earth and master
it”: The ancient and medieval career
of a Biblical text. London and Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Darwin, C. 1859. On the origin of
species by means of natural selection. London: Murray.
de Kok, W., ed. 1999. World animal
net directory, Edition 1.1. Boston:
World Animal Net.
Du Bois, W.E.B. 1969. The souls of
black folk. New York: Signet/New
American Library.

Finsen, L., and S. Finsen. 1994. The
animal rights movement in America: From compassion to respect.
New York: Twayne.
Forum on Religion and Ecology.
http://environment.harvard.edu/re
ligion (accessed March 16, 2003).
Gaffney, J. 1988. The relevance of
animal experimentation to Roman
Catholic ethical methodology. In
Animal sacrifices: Religious perspectives on the use of animals in
science, ed. T. Regan, 149–170.
Philadelphia: Temple University
Press.
Galdikas, B.M.F. 1995. Reflections of
Eden: My life with the orangutans of
Borneo. London: Victor Gollancz.
Gardner, H. 1985. The mind’s new
science: A history of the cognitive
revolution. New York: Basic.
Gould, S.J. 1995. Animals and us. The
New York Review of Books, August
19.
Grant, R.M. 1999. Early Christians
and animals. London and New
York: Routledge.
Griffin, D. 1992. Animal minds.
Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
_______. 1998. From cognition to
consciousness. Animal Cognition 1:
3–16.
Grim, J., ed. 2001. Indigenous traditions and ecology: The interbeing of
cosmology and community. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Jasper, J.M., and D. Nelkin. 1992. The
animal rights crusade: The growth
of a moral protest. New York: The
Free Press.
John Paul II. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis.
1987. Available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/e
ncyclicals.
———. Evangelium vitae. 1995. London: Catholic Truth Society.
Kalechofsky, R. 1991. Autobiography
of a revolutionary: Essays on animal and human rights. Marblehead,
Mass.: Micah Publications.
Kilby, C. 1995. The Christian world of
C.S. Lewis. Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing.

97

Küng, H., and K.J. Kuschel. 1993. A
global ethic: The declaration of the
parliament of the world religions.
London: SCM Press. Preface and
commentary translated by J. Bowden from Erklärung zum Weltethos.
Die Deklaration des Parlementes
der Weltreligionen. 1993. Münich:
R. Piper GmbH and Co. KG.
Lewis, C.S. 1963. Can Christians support vivisection? The Anti-Vivisectionist (March/April) 154–155.
Linzey. A. 1987. Christianity and the
rights of animals. New York: Crossroad.
_______. 1994a. Why Catholic teaching perpetuates cruelty. The AV
Magazine 102 (9): 8–11.
_______. 1994b. Animal theology.
London: SCM Press; and Chicago:
University of Illinois.
Linzey, A., and D. Cohn-Sherbok.
1997. After Noah: Animals and the
liberation of theology. London: Mowbray.
Manning, A., and J. Serpell, eds.
1994. Animals and human society:
Changing perspectives. London and
New York: Routledge.
Masri, B.A. 1987. Islamic concern for
animals. Petersfield, England: The
Athene Trust.
_______. 1989. Animals in Islam.
Petersfield, England: The Athene
Trust.
Mayr, E. 1982. The growth of biological thought: Diversity, evolution,
and inheritance. New York: Belknap
Press.
Merchant, C. 1980. The death of
nature: Women, ecology and the scientific revolution. San Francisco:
Harper and Row.
Miller, P. 1995. Jane Goodall. National Geographic 188.6: 102–129.
Moltmann, J. 1985. God in Creation:
An ecological doctrine of Creation.
London: SCM.
Pannenberg, W., T. Peters, ed. 1993.
Toward a theology of nature: Essays
on science and faith. Louisville:
Westminster/John Knox Press.
Parker, S.T., and K.R. Gibson, eds.
1990. “Language” and intelligence
in monkeys and apes: Comparative
developmental perspectives. Cam98

bridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Peek, C.W., M.A. Konty, and T.F. Frazier. 1997. Religion and ideological
support for social movements: The
case of animal rights. Journal for
the Scientific Study of Religion
36(3): 429–439.
Radner, D., and M. Radner. 1989. Animal consciousness. Buffalo, N.Y.:
Prometheus.
Regan, T., ed. 1986a. Animal sacrifices: Religious perspectives on the
use of animals in science. Philadelphia: Temple University Press
———, director and narrator. 1986b.
We are all Noah. Raleigh: Culture
and Animals Foundation.
Rickaby, J. 1888. Moral philosophy.
London: Longmans, Green.
Rollin, B.E. 1999. An introduction to
veterinary medical ethics: Theory
and cases. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
Tannenbaum, J. 1995. Veterinary
ethics: Animal welfare, client relations, competition, and collegiality.
St. Louis, Mo.: Mosby.
Romanes, G.J. 1885. Mental evolution
in animals. London: Kegan Paul,
Trench.
_______. 1886. Animal intelligence.
London: Kegan Paul, Trench.
Rowan, A., ed. 1988. Animals and
people sharing the world. Hanover,
N.H., and London: University Press
of New England.
Salisbury, J.E. 1994. The beast within:
Animals in the middle ages. New
York and London: Routledge.
Singer, P. 1990. Animal liberation.
Second edition. New York: Avon.
Suzuki, D., and P. Knudtson. 1992.
Wisdom of the elders: Honoring
sacred native visions of nature.
New York: Bantam.
Thomas, K. 1984. Man and the natural world: Changing attitudes in England 1500–1800. London: Penguin.
van Lawick-Goodall, J. 1971. In the
shadow of man. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Waldau, P. 1995. Interfaith dialogue
needs an inclusive global ethic.
World Faiths Encounter 11: 58–65.

_______. 2000a. On breadth and
exclusion in concepts of nonviolence. Philosophy East and West 50:
3 (July): 468–471.
_______. 2000b. Buddhism and animals rights. In Contemporary Buddhist Ethics, ed. D. Keown, The Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism
Series, 81–112. Richmond, Surrey,
England: Curzon Press.
_______. 2000c. The question of nonviolence in Hinduism and other traditions. International Journal of
Hindu Studies 4:1: 104–106 (review
of Subverting hatred: The challenge
of nonviolence in religious traditions).
_______. 2001a. The specter of
speciesism: Buddhist and Christian
views of animals. New York: Oxford
University Press.
_______. 2001b. Religion and which
sciences? Science and which community? The Journal of Faith and
Science IV: 115–142.
Watson, J.B. 1913. Psychology as the
behaviorist views it. Psychological
Review 20: 158–177.
White, L., Jr. 1967. The historic roots
of our ecologic crisis. Science 155:
1203–1207.
Wrangham, R.W., W.C. McGrew,
F.B.M. de Waal, and P.G. Heltne,
eds. 1994. Chimpanzee cultures.
Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.

The State of the Animals II: 2003

